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that allows the incumbent to extract an information rent. An information-
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1 Introduction
For a long time, indemnity-based reinsurance contracts have been the only way for
insurers to cede some of their risk and find protection against possible bankruptcy
following a large loss. In the past ten years, “Alternative Risk Transfer” (ART)
products with parametric or index triggers have been developed, a prominent example
are catastrophe (cat) bonds. Upon their introduction, ART products were expected
to grow quickly and become a significant supplement to reinsurance. Empirically
though, their growth has been low and stagnant, which seemed surprising given their
apparent benefits.
A main advantage of parametric or index triggers, as discussed in the literature,
is seen in its positive eﬀect on moral hazard, where the optimal use of ART products
trades oﬀ moral hazard and basis risk. We provide a novel argument in favour of
parametric or index based ART products: information-insensitive parametric or index
triggers help to overcome problems of asymmetric information when reinsurers are
better informed about the risk of their own clients’ insurance portfolios than about the
risk of potential clients, i.e., other insurers. Asymmetric information between inside
and outside reinsurers locks in insurers in their relation with their current reinsurer,
who is therefore able to extract an information rent. This rent is limited by the
competition from outside reinsurers. However, outside reinsurers must fear adverse
selection and bid less aggressively than they would without asymmetric information.
Information-insensitive ART products are not subject to the same adverse selection
problem. They aﬀect the competition between inside and outside reinsurers by placing
an upper bound on the premium that an insurer is willing to pay for reinsurance. ART
products help low-risk insurers to receive reinsurance at a lower premium without ever
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being used in equilibrium. They are not used because of basis risk and the presence
of an informed insider who can always oﬀer a better deal: reinsurers will adjust the
premiums so that it is never optimal for an insurer to choose the ART product over
indemnity-based reinsurance.
The analysis is done in the simplest setting possible. There is one insurer who
faces large cost of financial distress so that he wants to transfer risk to avoid the
cost. The insurer can obtain indemnity-based reinsurance from his current reinsurer
(incumbent or insider) or another reinsurer (outsider) or, alternatively, he can issue an
ART product with a parametric trigger. The insurer and the insider know whether the
insurer’s expected loss is high or low, while the outsider does not have this information.
Because of his information disadvantage an outsider fears that low-risk types will be
retained by insiders and that only high-risk types will change the reinsurer. If he
were certain to obtain only the high-risk types, he would set the premium equal to a
high-risk type’s expected loss. However, this would allow the insider to also increase
the premium that he demands from a low-risk type up to the same level (or slightly
below). Now it is profitable for the outsider to choose a premium below the insider’s
premium to sell to both types. Therefore, the insider and the outsider compete by
choosing premium between the pooling premium and a high-risk type’s expected loss
in a mixed strategy equilibrium. Hence, the expected premium that a low-risk insurer
has to pay exceeds the pooling premium. An ART product with a parametric trigger
is independent of the insurer’s expected loss and type. Therefore, it is not subject
to adverse selection. Instead, there will be basis risk as the cash flows generated by
the ART product will not be perfectly correlated with the insurer’s loss, leaving him
with a residual uninsured loss and the corresponding cost of financial distress. The
insurer will issue the ART product if the reinsurance premium net of expected losses
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exceeds the basis risk, which places an upper bound on the reinsurance premium
that an insurer will accept. The insider and the outsider take this into account
when making oﬀers, which reduces the premiums aimed at attracting a low-risk type.
Hence, parametric triggers can influence the reinsurance equilibrium and the hold-up
problem without ever actually being issued. Our predictions are in line with the low
and very slow growing demand for ART products and falling reinsurance premiums
following the introduction of ART products in the mid to late 90’s.
There exists a large literature that discusses potential benefits of ART products.
One strand of the literature focuses on benefit of using index and parametric triggers
to reduce moral hazard (Doherty, 1997) and how reinsurance can complement these
ART products to reduce basis risk (Doherty and Richter, 2002, and Nell and Richter,
2002). Another strand argues that large catastrophic losses are costly to insure using
traditional insurers or reinsurers because these intermediaries have high cost of raising
and holding capital (see, e.g., Jaﬀee and Russell, 1997, Froot, 1997, 2001, and Niehaus,
2002).
Our main contribution is to provide a novel argument in favour of ART products
with index or parametric triggers and to analyze their impact on competition in the
market for traditional reinsurance. Froot (2001) argues that cat bonds reduce barri-
ers to entry and that therefore the reinsurance market has become more contested,
thereby decreasing premiums for traditional reinsurance. In our model the source of
reinsurers’ market power is asymmetric information between reinsurers that creates
an adverse selection problem and therefore reduces competition. While we assume
that an insider gains an information advantage over outsiders, we can alternatively
assume that some reinsurers are more capable of evaluating an insurer’s expected loss.
Cat bonds with index or parametric triggers can reduce the cost of entry as they are
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not subject to adverse selection. However, because of basis risk, the alternative does
not restore perfect competition.
Basis risk is sometimes viewed a major obstacle to using index or indemnity-linked
ART products. While ART products are not used in our model, the benefit of being
able to use them would greatly diminish in the presence of large basis risk. However,
Cummins, Lalonde, and Phillips (2000, 2002) show that, at least for hedging cat losses
from Hurricanes in Florida, basis risk is unlikely to deter insurers from potentially
using index-linked cat securities to hedge their exposure.
Our setting is closely related to the literature on relationship lending and informa-
tional lock-in in banking as developed as developed by Fischer (1990), Sharpe (1990),
Rajan (1992), and von Thadden (2001). We apply this setting to the reinsurance
market and extend the analysis by introducing an alternative that is information in-
sensitive to the quality of insurers. The setting is closest to the one by Fischer (1990)
and von Thadden (2001).
Informational lock-in in the insurance sector has been analyzed by Kunreuther
and Pauly (1985), Cooper and Hayes (1987), and Nilssen (2000). Kunreuther and
Pauly (1985) use a multi-period model with experience rating and myopic customer
behavior and find informational lock-in for low-risk types. Nilssen (2000) shows that
type-contingent contracts weaken, but do not always eliminate the informational lock-
in. Cooper and Hayes (1987), in contrast, assume that the supplier of insurance can
commitment to long-term contracts. Ge and Cox (2003) find empirical evidence for
informational lock-in in insurance markets.
The paper is structured as follows. We introduce the model in the next section.
The equilibriumwithout ART products is analyzed in Section 3, where we focus on the
problem of informational lock-in between insurers and reinsurers. ART products are
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introduced in Section 4, where we discuss the eﬀect of the availability of ART products
on reinsurance premiums. Extensions and empirical implications are discussed in
Section 5. Section 6 concludes. Proof are relegated to the appendix and figures to
the end of the paper.
2 The model
We consider a two-period model with three types of risk-neutral agents, a (repre-
sentative) primary insurer, reinsurers, and investors. In each period the (primary)
insurer can incur a catastrophic loss. The expected loss depends on the insurer’s type,
high risk or low risk. Without loss of generality, we assume that a catastrophic event
occurs with probability θ and that, conditional on the catastrophic event, the insurer
realizes a lossX with probability pi ∈ {pl, ph}, where pl denotes the loss probability of
the low-risk type and ph the loss probability of the high-risk type, with pl < ph. The
proportion of low-risk types in the economy is q and the proportion of high-risk types
is 1 − q. If there is no catastrophic event, the insurer incurs no loss. Catastrophic
events are independent over time and the risk-free interest rate is zero.
The loss X, if borne by the insurer, results in (indirect) bankruptcy cost B. This
assumption captures the idea that a large loss is diﬃcult to finance ex post, that this
can distort incentives and that policyholders are then reluctant to do business with
the insurer.
In each period the insurer can finance the potential loss ex ante by either buying a
one-period reinsurance contract that indemnifies the loss X or by issuing a one-period
ART product that pays X conditional on the realization of a parametric trigger or
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an index, e.g., a cat bond.1 Given a catastrophic event, the ART product pays the
amount X with probability pT . We assume that the probability does not depend on
the insurer’s type. This assumption implies that a parametric trigger is used or that
the insurer’s portfolio is a negligible part of the index. We make this assumption for
ease of exposition. The ART product is described in more detail in Section 4.
If the insurer’s loss is covered by the reinsurance contract or the ART product,
no bankruptcy cost B occurs. Without loss of generality, we assume that the insurer
always finds it worthwhile to buy protection given the equilibrium conditions of the
available contracts. Relaxing this assumption does not change our results about the
role of ART products; a brief discussion is provided in Section 5.3.
Two-period reinsurance contracts are not available. This reflects the observation
that in practice multi-period reinsurance contracts are rare, probably also because
long-term contracts in more general settings can result in incentive problems and
complete contracts cannot be written.
All parameters, but the specific type of the insurer, are common knowledge. Ini-
tially, the insurer’s type is unknown even to the insurer. The insurer and, if reinsur-
ance is used in the first period, the reinsurer who provides this reinsurance (insider)
learns the insurer’s type after the first period. We focus on the eﬀect that ART prod-
ucts have on the price of reinsurance contracts in the second period, when the insider
has an information advantage over other reinsurers (outsiders) about the insurer’s
type. Therefore, we assume that the insurer uses a reinsurance contract in the first
1For example, the payoﬀ might depend on a predetermined Richter scale value for an earthquake
in a special geographic region. While indemnity triggers used to dominate the contract specifications
in the beginning, now 96% of all ART products are based on parametric triggers or index thresholds,
see Lane and Beckwith (2003) for details.
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period and show in Section 5.1 that this is indeed optimal for the insurer. Moreover,
we assume that full reinsurance is obtained from one reinsurer; the possibility to use
multiple reinsurers and retention are discussed in Sections 5.2 and 5.3.
In the first period there is no asymmetric information and Bertrand competition
between reinsurers. Reinsurers j = 1, ..,m quote the premiums Kj at which they
are willing to indemnify the insurer’s loss. The insurer randomly picks a contract
from the group of reinsurers who demand the lowest premium. A loss is realized
with probability θpi, which is then indemnified by the reinsurer. The insurer and
the incumbent reinsurer learn the insurer’s type i ∈ {h, l}. In the second period the
incumbent and outside reinsurers quote the premiums at which they are willing to
indemnify the insurer’s loss. For ease of exposition, we assume that there is one rep-
resentative outsider who chooses the premium to be equal to the expected indemnity
payment in equilibrium. Kj, with j ∈ {in, out} , is the premium demanded by the
incumbent and the outsider respectively. The insurer chooses between a reinsurance
contract and an ART product with a parametric trigger, which he can obtain at a fair
premium. The insurer maximizes the total expected net payoﬀ; if he is indiﬀerent,
he stays with the incumbent. Losses are again realized with probability θpi and the
contract makes the promised payment.
3 Reinsurance equilibrium
In this section we analyze the competition between asymmetrically informed reinsur-
ers if only indemnity-based reinsurance contracts are available. The insider and the
outsider simultaneously quote the premiums at which they are willing to oﬀer full
reinsurance. The insider has an information advantage over the outsider as he knows
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whether the expected loss is θplX or θphX and can therefore oﬀer diﬀerent contracts
to both types, Kin(l) and Kin(h). The outsider oﬀers a type-independent premium
Kout. We define Kl ≡ θplX, Kh ≡ θphX, and Kpool ≡ (1 − q + qpl)θX as the fair
premiums for a low-risk and a high-risk type and the pooling premium, respectively.
The outsider does not know the type and must fear that only a high-risk type changes
the reinsurer. To show the problem of asymmetric information between reinsurers, we
suppose that the outsider demands the pooling premium, i.e., Kout = Kpool. At this
premium a reinsurer expects to break even if both types accept the contract. The in-
sider can attract the low-risk type by demanding a premium Kin(l) = Kout and leave
the high-risk type to the outsider by demanding the fair premium, Kin(h) = Kh.
(Recall that we assume that the insurer chooses the insider if he is indiﬀerent. Alter-
natively, the insider has to choose Kin(l) slightly below Kout.) The outsider foresees
that only a high-risk type will accept the contract. To break even, he has to set
Kout = Kh. Again, it is optimal for the incumbent to choose Kin(l) = Kout, which
is now equal to Kh. But this cannot be an equilibrium either, because outsiders can
now make a profit by oﬀering reinsurance at a premium Kpool < Kout < Kh, which
will be chosen by both types if Kin(l) = Kh. The following lemma directly follows
from the discussion.
Lemma 1 There exists no equilibrium in pure strategies.
Instead, there exists a mixed equilibrium in which the insider and the outsider
randomize. The insider sells to the low-risk type whenever Kin(l) ≤ Kout. In this
case the outsider is left with the high-risk type and makes a loss if Kout < Kh. If
Kin(l) > Kout, both types choose the outsider’s contract and the expected indemnity
payment equalsKpool. Therefore, Kpool places a lower bound onKout whileKout = Kh
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constitutes an upper bound at which the outsider’s profit from selling to a high risk
type is zero.
Proposition 1 The following mixed strategies constitute a Nash equilibrium:
(i) The insurer chooses the contract with the lowest premium; if he is indiﬀerent, he
stays with the insider.
(ii) The insider chooses Kin(h) = Kh for a high-risk type and Kin(l) ∈ [Kpool,Kh]
with density
ω(K) =
Kpool −Kl
q(K −Kl)2
(1)
for a low-risk type.
(iii) The outsider chooses Kout ∈ [Kpool,Kh] where Kout = Kh has a point mass of
(1− q) and Kout ∈ [Kpool, θX) has density
φ(K) = qω(K). (2)
The insider’s information advantage allows him to earn a rent, which equals the
expected profit that he makes at Kin(l) = Kpool. In this case a low-risk type always
stays with the insider and the rent is Kpool − Kl. Increasing Kin(l) increases the
expected profit from a low-risk insurer, but reduces the probability of selling rein-
surance to a low-risk type because now the outsider’s premium may be lower. The
outsider’s mixed strategy has the property that the insider is indiﬀerent between any
Kin(l) ∈ [Kpool, Kh]. The outsider’s expected profit equals zero, which he can guar-
antee by choosing Kout = Kh. In this case he will never sell to a low-risk insurer. By
reducing Kout, the outsider might also sell to a low-risk insurer, but at the same time
he will make an expected loss if he does not succeed in underbidding the insider. The
insider’s mixed strategy has the property that the outsider is indiﬀerent between any
Kout ∈ [Kpool,Kh].
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The insider’s ex ante expected information rent is q (Kpool −Kl) = q(1−q) (Kh −Kl) .
It has a maximum at q = 0.5; increasing q has a positive eﬀect since it increases the
probability of a low-risk type, but also a negative eﬀect as it reduces the pooling
premium. The rent also depends on the diﬀerence between the expected losses of a
high-risk type and a low-risk type, Kh −Kl. This diﬀerence can be interpreted as a
measure of the degree of adverse selection in the economy. The higher the degree of
adverse selection, the more valuable is the inside information and the higher is the
rent that the insider can extract.
We now take a closer look at a low-risk insurer’s cost of buying reinsurance in the
described equilibrium. The insurer buys reinsurance either from the insider or from
the outsider at the premium min{Kin(l),Kout}. Since E[min{Kin(l), Kout}] > Kpool,
the expected premium exceeds the pooling premium. Therefore, a low risk-type with
an inside reinsurer has higher cost of buying reinsurance than he would in a pooling
equilibrium. The reason is that with asymmetric information about the insurer’s
type, an uninformed outsider’s bid is less aggressive because of the adverse selection
problem. With symmetric information, the outsider would bid Kpool. The potential
profit from insuring a low-risk insurer, Kpool −Kl, compensates for the potential loss
from selling to a high-risk insurer, Kh − Kpool. This cross subsidization of types
is required for a reinsurer to expect to break even in a pooling equilibrium. With
asymmetric information, cross subsidization is still important, but now the outsider
also has to be compensated for situations in which only a high-risk type accepts an
oﬀer Kout < Kh. To obtain this additional profit from a low-risk type, the insider
must not bid too aggressively. The expected cross subsidization, i.e., the profit that
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the outsider expects to make from a low-risk type, is
E
£
Πout|l¤ = Z Kh
Kpool
(1− Ω(K))(K −Kl)φ(K)dK (3)
=
(1− q)2
q
(Kh −Kl)
·
q
1− q + ln(1− q)
¸
,
and derived in the appendix. In addition, the insider’s expected rent from a low-risk
type is E [Πin|l] = (Kpool −Kl) . We can therefore quantify the expected cost of the
adverse selection problem for a low-risk type:
E[min{Kin(l),Kout}]−Kl = E
£
Πin|l¤+E £Πout|l¤
= (Kpool −Kl)
·
2 +
1− q
q
ln(1− q)
¸
.
The expected cost to a low-risk type consists of the expected rent that the insider
extracts and the expected cross subsidization in the outsider’s oﬀer. Therefore, a
low-risk type will finance the insider’s expected profit and the outsider’s expected
loss from insuring a high-risk type at a premium below Kh.
4 ART product
Catastrophe (cat) bonds have emerged as a capital market based alternative to rein-
surance about ten years ago. From the perspective of our paper a main diﬀerence to
an indemnity-based reinsurance contract is that the payment is not conditional on the
actual loss of the insurer, but on the realization of a parametric trigger or an index.
Cat bonds are structured similar to regular bonds with an additional forgiveness pro-
vision. If an insurer issues cat bond, the investors pay the principal amount X to a
“special purpose vehicle”, which acts as a clearing institution. If the trigger is set oﬀ,
the insurer gets the principal X and the investors loose their investment, otherwise
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they get back the full amount X. In addition, investors receive a fixed premium that
compensates them for the potential loss of the principal amount. The premium equals
θpTX, which is the expected loss for investors and the cat bond’s expected payoﬀ to
the insurer who issued it.
An important feature of the cat bond is the trigger’s correlation with the insurer’s
loss. The higher the correlation, the lower is the basis risk and therefore the expected
bankruptcy cost. We define piT as the probability that the trigger is set oﬀ and that
an insurer of type i ∈ {l, h} incurs a loss, with piT ∈ (pTpi,min{pi, pT}). That is, the
higher piT , the higher the correlation between the trigger and the insurer’s loss. The
lowest value, pTpi, corresponds to the case of zero correlation, and the highest value,
min{pi, pT} to the case of maximum correlation. With a cat bond the insurer pays the
fair premium for the insurance component, but unless the cat bond’s payoﬀ and the
insurer’s loss are perfectly correlated, i.e., pi = piT , the insurer of type i has to bear
basis risk Briski ≡ (pi − piT ) θB. (For ease of exposition, we assume that Brisk > 0.)
A low-risk insurer trades oﬀ the diﬀerence between the premium and his expected
loss for an indemnity based reinsurance contract, K −Kl, and the basis risk, Briskl ,
which he incurs when he uses an ART product. He chooses the reinsurance contract
if K−Kl ≤ Briskl . Hence, the availability of the ART product places an upper bound
on the reinsurance premium that a low-risk type will accept. It is the highest K for
which the inequality is binding. That is,
KmaxART ≡ Kl +Briskl . (4)
Put diﬀerently, if min{Kin(l), Kout} > KmaxART , the insurer chooses the ART product
instead of the reinsurance contract.
A high-risk insurer will never choose an ART product over reinsurance, because
the maximum premium he has to pay is the fair premium, Kh. Therefore, with
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reinsurance, a low-risk insurer can avoid basis risk and might benefit from a premium
below his expected loss.
The insider makes zero profit if the low-risk insurer does not buy insurance from
him. Hence, the insider will never demand a premium that exceeds KmaxART . The
constraint binds if the maximum premium in the equilibrium in Proposition 1, Kh,
exceeds KmaxART . Rearranging Kh > KmaxART = Kl + (pl − plT )θB yields
B < Bcrit1 ≡
Kh −Kl¡
pl − plT
¢
θ
. (5)
Condition (5) holds ceteris paribus for low bankruptcy cost, B, a "high correlation"
between the insurer’s and the ART product’s payoﬀ, plT , and for a high degree of
adverse selection, Kh −Kl.
For very low KmaxART the insider may not even be able to demand the pooling
premium, Kpool. Formally, this is the case if
B < Bcrit2 ≡
Kpool −Kl¡
pl − plT
¢
θ
. (6)
If this condition is satisfied, the following proposition holds.
Proposition 2 Assume that an ART product as described above is available. For
B ≤ Bcrit2, the following pure strategies constitutes a Nash equilibrium:
(i) A high-risk insurer always chooses the reinsurance contract with the lowest pre-
mium. A low-risk insurer chooses the contract with the lowest premium if the premium
does not exceed KmaxART , otherwise he chooses the ART product; if he is indiﬀerent, he
stays with the insider.
(ii) The insider chooses Kin(h) = Kh and Kin(h) = KmaxART .
(iii) The outsider chooses Kout = Kh.
The insurer always stays with the insider, the ART product is never chosen
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If (6) holds, the ART product constrains the insider to choose a premium for a
low-risk type below the pooling premium. The outsider will never oﬀer a premium
below the pooling premium because his contract is chosen either by both insurers or
only by the high-risk insurer, yielding an expected loss. The premium that the insider
oﬀers to a low-risk type is suﬃciently low so that it is never optimal for the insider
to choose the ART product.
If (6) is violated, but (5) holds, we again obtain a mixed strategy equilibrium with
KmaxART as a new upper bound. The following proposition states the new equilibrium.
Proposition 3 Assume that an ART product as described above is available. For
Bcrit2 < B ≤ Bcrit1, the following mixed strategies constitutes a Nash equilibrium:
(i) The insurer behaves as in Proposition 2.
(ii) The insider chooses Kin(h) = Kh and Kin(l) ∈ [Kpool,KmaxART ] where Kin(l) =
Kpool is chosen with probability
1− q
q
·
Bcrit1
B
− 1
¸
and Kin(l) ∈ (Kpool,KmaxART ] with density ωART (K) = ω(K).
(iii) The outsider chooses Kout ∈ {[Kpool,KmaxART ] , Kh} where Kout = Kh is chosen
with probability
(1− q)Bcrit1
B
and Kout ∈ [Kpool, KmaxART ] with density φART (K) = φ(K).
The ART product is never chosen in equilibrium.
For B = Bcrit1 , we obtain KmaxART = Kh, and the equilibrium strategies are equiv-
alent to those in Proposition 1. As B and therefore KmaxART decrease, the insider no
longer chooses Kin(l) ∈ (KmaxART ,Kh] because a low-risk insurer would then choose the
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ART product; the probability mass over this region is shifted to Kin(l) = Kpool. As
a consequence, the outsider will also no longer oﬀer contracts in this region because
these contracts will only be accepted by a high-risk type; the probability mass is
shifted to Kout = Kh. For B = Bcrit2, we obtain KmaxART = Kpool and a pure strategy
equilibrium with Kin(l) = Kpool and Kout = Kh. This equilibrium coincides with the
one in Proposition 2 for B = Bcrit2.
The reinsurers’ equilibrium strategies depend on the basis risk of the ART product
for the low-risk type. The the higher the bankruptcy cost, the higher the basis risk
when using the ART product and the higher the value from a perfect hedge through
an indemnity reinsurance contract.
Proposition 4 The availability of an ART product reduces the hold-up and adverse
selection problem inherent in the reinsurance relationship. For Bcrit2 < B, the source
of the benefit to a low-risk insurer is a reduction in the insider’s rent. For Bcrit2 ≤
B < Bcrit1, the source of the benefit is that the ART product reduces the expected cross
subsidization.
For Bcrit2 ≤ B < Bcrit1 , the insider can still guarantee himself an expected profit
of Kpool−Kl since a reinsurance contract with a pooling premium is preferred to the
ART product by a low-risk type. However, the expected premium that the insider
demands from a low-risk type is lower and the insider therefore has to pay a lower
expected premium. It may come as a surprise that the insider is nevertheless able to
capture the same rent as without the ART product. To understand the rationale it is
important to observe that a higher premium does not result in a higher profit because
the likelihood that the outsider underbids the oﬀer increases as well and the insider’s
expected profit does not change. The benefit of a lower premium for a low-risk insurer
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stems from a higher expected premium for a high-risk insurer. The outsider puts less
probability mass on premiums with which he tries to attract a low-risk insurer if the
insider reduces the premium. This reduces the probability that a high-risk insurer
benefits from premiums below his expected loss. That is, the expected amount of
cross-subsidization is smaller than in the pure reinsurance case. For a low-risk type,
the diﬀerence between the expected cross subsidization in the pure reinsurance case
and in the case with the ART product is
∆ =
(1− q)2
q
(Kh −Kl)
·
Kh −Kl
Briskl
− ln
·
Kh −Kl
Briskl
¸
− 1
¸
> 0 (7)
for Bcrit2 < B < Bcrit1 and derived in the appendix. The diﬀerence is decreasing in
the ART product’s basis risk, Briskl , and reaches zero for B = Bcrit1 . The intuition is
that with higher basis risk the upper boundary of the equilibrium strategies is raised,
increasing the probability masses on [Kpool, KmaxART ]. ∆ is increasing in the degree
of adverse selection, Kh − Kl, as its eﬀect on cross subsidization increases in the
probability that a high-risk type receives a premium below his expected loss, which
is higher without the ART product.
If B ≤ Bcrit2, the cross subsidization is zero. The insider’s information rent is now
determined by the basis risk of the ART product for the low-risk type, Briskl .
Figure 1 shows the dependence of the insider’s rent and the degree of cross subsi-
dization on the bankruptcy cost, B.
17
5 Discussion
5.1 First period
In the first period, all reinsurers have the same information and will therefore place
identical bids. Since all reinsurers can become insiders when winning the bid in the
first period, Bertrand competition will drive down the first-period premium which
then internalizes the insider’s second-period rent. Bertrand competition implies per-
fect competition, no financing constraints for the reinsurers, and full internalization
of insider profits. The first-period premium is then
Kt=0 =



Kpool − q(Kpool −Kl) B > Bcrit2
Kpool − qBriskl B < Bcrit2.
(8)
The level of expected cross subsidization plays no role because this is a redistrib-
ution between types and in the first period insurers do not know their types either.
The expected value of cross subsidization is zero.
These costs have to be compared to the costs of the alternative of issuing an ART
product in the first period and then issuing either an ART product in the second
period or buying reinsurance at the pooling premium.
Lemma 2 Given the premiums in (8), it is never optimal to issue an ART product
in the first period; the availability of an ART product reduces the discount in the
premium in the first period if B < Bcrit2.
The first part of the lemma follows directly from the observation that insurers
receive a fair premium in the first period that takes into account the rent that is
extracted in the second period. In contrast, the ART product involves basis risk. The
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second part follows directly from the observation that the insider’s second-period rent
is reduced when an ART product is available and B < Bcrit2 .
The analysis of the first period seems to suggest that ART products are irrele-
vant since insurers are compensated for the future extraction of information rents by
lower premiums in the first period. However, this is not true. First, the benefit of
using ART products in the second period remains: low-risk insurers benefit from the
availability of ART products in the second period; no matter how large the discount
was in the first period. Second, reinsurers must be willing to pay for expected future
rents. In a more general setting, they may be reluctant to do so because of potential
intertemporal incentive and hold-up problems—such as, e.g., the threat to invent ART
products.
5.2 Multiple insiders
We now consider the case where the insurer can obtain reinsurance from multiple
reinsurers in first period. In the absence of monitoring costs and with symmetric in-
formation by insiders, Bertrand competition will drive down the premiums demanded
by the insiders from a low-risk type in the second period to the fair premium, Kl.
The ART product will then have no impact on the premiums as competition between
insiders eliminates the lock-in from asymmetric information. However, this argument
critically hinges on the assumption that both insiders will have the same information.
If they may end up with asymmetric information, the situation is equivalent to the
one with an informed insider and an uninformed outsider. Rajan (1991, 1992) argues
that in the presence of even small monitoring cost and unequal access to a firm’s
information, insiders are again able to extract information rents, reestablishing the
impact that the ART product exerts on the reinsurers’ strategies.
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5.3 Retention
We have assumed that it is always optimal for the insurer to buy reinsurance. This
assumption is particularly relevant for a low-risk type in the second period. If the
premium exceed the sum of the expected loss and bankruptcy cost, i.e., K > Kl +
θplB, it is not optimal for the insurer to buy reinsurance.2 Therefore, the possibility
not to buy reinsurance also places an upper bound on the possible price ifKl+θplB <
Kh. The new equilibrium is equivalent to the equilibrium described in Proposition
3 for Kpool ≤ Kl + θplB and the equilibrium described in Proposition 2 for Kpool >
Kl + θplB, where KmaxART = Kl + Briskl is replaced by Kl + θplB. The constraint
imposed by the ART product is always stricter than "no insurance" since the basis
risk, Briskl = (pl − plT )θB, is strictly lower than the expected bankruptcy cost, θplB,
whenever plT > 0.
If Rothschild-Siglitz type "price-quantity policies" are possible, outsiders may
oﬀer two types of contracts, one with full insurance and a premium Kh for a high-risk
type (h-contract) and one with partial insurance and a fair premium for a low-risk
type (l-contract), where the retention is chosen so that a high-risk type will not
choose this contract. Without loss of generality, we assume that the retention is
implemented through a probability q > 0 with which, conditional on a loss, the
insurer is not reimbursed for this loss, while he receives X with probability 1 − q.
Incentive compatibility implies that the cost saving for a high-risk type net of the
increase in expected bankruptcy cost must not be positive, when choosing the l-
contract instead of the h-contract, i.e., (1 − q)(Kh −Kl) − qθphB ≤ 0. The lowest
2We note that we implicitly assume that holding capital as an alternative way of protection is
too costly due to regulatory and agency cost as well as accounting and tax rules that penalize the
accumulation of equity capital. For details, see Jaﬀee and Russell (1997).
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q that satisfies this condition is q = (Kh − Kl)/(θphB + Kh − Kl). Again, this
contract places an upper bound on the maximum price that a low-risk insurer is
willing to pay for full reinsurance coverage. The argument is analogous to the case
of no reinsurance, which is akin to q = 1 and where the maximum premium that a
low-risk type is willing to pay for full insurance is Kl + qθplB. The ART product
is useful even with Rothschild-Siglitz type "price-quantity policies" if the basis risk
is lower than the expected bankruptcy cost with the incentive-compatible retention,
i.e., if Briskl = (pl − plT )θB < qθplB. Rearranging terms yields 1− plT/pl < q.
5.4 Monitoring cost
So far, we have assumed that the insider obtains the information about the insurer’s
type at no cost. If monitoring is costly, the resulting equilibrium and the impact of
the ART product depends also on the level of the monitoring cost. Let c denote the
fixed monitoring cost per insurer. For B > Bcrit2 , the insider’s expected net profit is
E [Πin] = q(Kpool−Kl)− c. Monitoring will take place and inside information will be
obtained if c < q(Kpool −Kl). The equilibrium strategies and the boundaries of the
mixed equilibrium remain unchanged because the outsider never monitors and the
insider finances the monitoring cost through his expected profit. If the monitoring
cost exceeds the expected insider profit, nobody monitors and no inside information
is revealed. The game in the second period is the same as in the first period with all
reinsurers demanding the pooling premium. For B > Bcrit2 , the insurer will always
buy reinsurance in both periods since the expected cost of issuing an ART product
are higher than the cost of reinsurance.
If B < Bcrit2 , the insider’s expected net profit is reduced to E [Πin] = qBriskl − c.
As long as the expected profit exceeds the monitoring cost, i.e., c < qBriskl , the game
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is the same as in the case without monitoring cost. The only diﬀerence is that the
insider’s profit is reduced by the monitoring cost. If the monitoring cost exceeds the
expected insider profit, no monitoring takes place and reinsurers will demand the
pooling premium in the first period. In the second period a low-risk types will issue
the ART product and a high-risk types will be reinsured at their fair premium of Kh.
5.5 Transaction cost and risk premium
We have assumed zero transaction costs on the side of the reinsurance or the ART
product. For the reinsurance, these costs could arise from overhead cost, cost of
capital, other opportunity cost or minimum return requirements on the reinsurance
portfolio. Such costs lead to a higher required break-even premium for all types, and
raise the boundaries of the mixed strategy equilibrium. Let us denote the additional
cost by cRI . The break even premium is then (Ki + cRI) for an insurer of type i.
The randomization range in the pure reinsurance setting is ceteris paribus given by
[Kpool + cRI ,Kh + cRI ] in the pure reinsurance case. The equilibrium densities are
changed to
ωˆ(K) =
Kpool −Kl
q (K −Kl + cRI)2
and
φˆ(K) = qωˆ(K).
The insider’s profit and the cross subsidization remain unchanged compared to the
case without opportunity costs, as the higher premiums just cover the additional cost.
Analogously, transaction cost or a risk premium demanded by the investors raise
the costs of issuing an ART product. Let us denote the additional cost per unit of
the ART product by cART . The maximum premium that a low-risk type will pay in
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the presence of an ART product is now
KmaxART = Kl +Briskl + cART
Assume
Bˆcrit2 ≡
Kpool −Kl + cRI − cART
(pl − plT )θ
< B <
Kh −Kl + cRI − cART
(pl − plT )θ
≡ Bˆcrit1.
While the insider’s profit remains unchanged for the case of B0crit2 < B < B
0
crit1
because the costs are accounted for by the higher premiums, the cross subsidization
now depends on the relative size of the costs of the diﬀerent instruments. Compared
to the case without additional costs, the cross subsidization increases for cART > cRI
and vice versa.
For B < Bˆcrit2, we will again have an equilibrium in pure strategies with the
insider oﬀering reinsurance to the high-risk types at Kh+cRI and to low risk types at
K = max{Kl+Briskl +cART , Kl+cRI}. If the opportunity cost of reinsurance exceeds
the basis risk and the opportunity cost of the ART product, i.e., cRI > cART +Briskl ,
it is optimal for a low-risk type to choose the ART product. Therefore, diﬀerential
transaction costs may be a reason for using the ART product.
5.6 Empirical implications
In this section we discuss some empirical implications of our model. Most importantly,
in our model the benefit of ART products arises from their availability, not from their
use. Therefore, our predictions are in line with the observation that cat bonds are
rarely used. Cat bonds account for only one percent of the entire catastrophe reinsur-
ance volume and the market share has been stagnant since their first introduction in
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the mid 90’s, as shown in Figure 2.3 Figure 3 shows that the number of issues stayed
relatively constant at around eight issues per year with a peak in 1999. Guy Car-
penter (2004) reports that of the 33 issues with non-indemnity triggers, only 6 have
been issued by insurers and three by corporations, the remaining 24 have been issued
by reinsurers. Trading of Property Claim Services (PCS) options on the CBOT de-
creased to virtually zero by the end of 1999 and was discontinued. Similarly, the trade
of catastrophe-linked options on the Bermuda Commodities Exchange was suspended
in 1999 due to lack of activity.
The second implication of the model is that reinsurance premiums ceteris paribus
decline with the introduction of ART products. Empirical and anecdotal evidence
that ART products decrease reinsurance premiums is found by Froot (2001). Figure
4 shows the ratio of premiums to expected losses. This ratio declined from 1994 to
1999 and increases again since 2001. Naturally, premiums are not only influenced by
expected losses and we do not suggest that the development is entirely driven by the
introduction of ART products. Nevertheless, the overall development of premiums is
in line with the model’s predictions for the mid to late 90’s.
We would expect to observe the premiums to decrease more in countries with
highly developed capital markets where bankruptcy cost are lower and in regions
where very specific perils exist, which allow for a higher correlation between the
individual insurer’s losses and the parametric trigger or the index. Unfortunately, no
detailed country-based data is available.
As discussed in Section 5.5, ART products might be issued if they also have a
3Data are from Guy Carpenter (2004) and Swiss Re (2002). The first cat bonds were issued in
1995, but were mostly indemnity based so that they closely resembled classical reinsurance contracts.
Data on issuances and volumes is consistently recorded since 1997.
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comparative cost advantage over reinsurance and the basis risk is low. Therefore
we also expect to see a higher demand for ART products in countries with highly
developed capital markets and regions with very specific perils and highly correlated
triggers and indices. Figure 5 shows a higher percentage share of cat bonds in the US
and Japan for 1997. Both regions do not only have well developed capital markets, but
Californian and Japanese Earthquakes as well as East-Coast hurricanes and Japanese
typhoons are well specified and regionally concentrated perils.
6 Conclusion
We have shown how the existence of information-insensitive ART products can reduce
the asymmetric information and lock-in problem in a reinsurance relationship and dis-
cipline the rent extraction from insider information. The availability of information-
insensitive ART products reduces the maximum demandable reinsurance premium
for suﬃciently small basis risk. As consequence, the reinsurers place less probability
mass on their mixed equilibrium strategies which decreases the degree of cross sub-
sidization from the low risk types to the high risk types. If the costs of issuing ART
products are even lower than the pooling premium, cross subsidization is zero and
the insider’s information rent is reduced. The disciplining eﬀect of the ART product
is just exerted through its presence - in the basic model it will never be actually
issued. These main results are robust to a number of extensions. The empirical im-
plications of the model are in line with the very low and stagnant market share of
ART products and a decrease in the ratio of reinsurance premiums to expected losses
following the introduction of ART products in the mid 90’s. Since the results of the
model are mainly driven by the diﬀerence in information sensitivity of the individual
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instruments, they may also be relevant in other financing situations in which infor-
mation sensitivity impacts premiums and prices such as, for example, in the credit
securitization literature.
7 Appendix
Proof of Proposition 1. The proof is closely related to von Thadden (2001) and the
equilibrium concept uses the results from auction theory for asymmetrically informed
bidders by Engelbrecht-Wiggans, Milgrom, and Weber (1983). First, we show that
the interval K ∈ [Kpool, Kh] is the optimal support for the randomization strategies.
For any bid below the pooling premium, the outsider’s participation constraint is
violated, so his minimum premium will be Kpool. Therefore, it also cannot be optimal
for the insider to oﬀer a lower premium to the low risk type because raising the
premium to the pooling premium increases profits. The upper bound Kh follows
from the zero-profit constraint for oﬀering a contract to a high-risk type.4
Second, we derive the optimal strategies. Let Φ(K) denote the cumulative den-
sity function (CDF) of the mixed equilibrium strategy by the outsider and Ω(K)
denote the insider’s CDF. Given the oﬀer Kout, the outsider’s expected net payoﬀ
is Πout(Kout) = (1 − Ω(Kout))(Kout − Kpool) + Ω(Kout)(1 − q)(Kout − Kh), where
(1 − Ω(Kout)) is the probability that Kout < Kin(l). The expected profit in this
case is the premium minus the expected average loss. If Kout ≥ Kin(l), a low risk
type stays with the insider and the outsider will only sell the reinsurance contract
if the insurer has high-risk, which occurs with probability (1 − q) and results in an
4With Bertrand-competition between outside insurers, the upper bound converges to θX. (See
von Thadden (2001) or Engelbrecht-Wiggans, Milgrom, and Weber (1983).)
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expected loss of Kout−Kh. In equilibrium, the outsider makes an expected profits of
zero. Moreover, in the mixed strategy equilibrium the outsider must be indiﬀerent be-
tween diﬀerent premiumsKout. Hence, Πout(Kout) = 0 for allKout ∈ [Kpool, Kh]. From
(1−Ω(Kout))(Kout−Kpool) = −Ω(Kout)(1−q)(Kout−Kh) andKpool = qKl+(1−q)Kh
the insider’s CDF is Ω(K) = [K −Kpool] / [q(K −Kl)] for K ∈ [Kpool,Kh].
Given the outsider’s mixed strategy Φ(K), the insider’s expected net payoﬀ is
Πin(Kin(l)) = q[(1−Φ(Kin(l)))(Kin(l)−Kl)] forKin(l) ∈ [Kpool,Kh) andΠin(Kin(l) =
Kh) = q[Pr(Kout = θX)(Kh −Kl)] for Kin(l) = Kh. At Kin(l) = Kpool the low-risk
type will always stay with the insider who makes an expected profit of Πin(Kpool) =
Kpool −Kl. In a mixed strategy equilibrium the insider must be indiﬀerent between
diﬀerent Kin(l) given the outsider’s strategy. Therefore, it must be the case that
Πin(Kin(l)) = Πin(Kpool) for all Kin ∈ [Kpool, Kh]. From this we can derive the the
outsider’s equilibrium strategy, which is Φ(K) = [K −Kpool] / [K −Kl] = qΩ(K) for
K ∈ [Kpool, Kh) and Φ(K) = 1 for K = Kh. The densities of the players’ strategies
can now be derived by diﬀerentiating the CDFs with respect to K, which yields (1)
and (2). ¤
Equation (3). Assume that the insurer is a low-risk type; given the premium K, the
outsider’s expected profit is Πout(K) = (1 − Ω(K))(K − Kl) = [(1− q)/q] (Kh −
K). Taking the expectation over the choice of K yields E [Πout|l] = R KhKpool(1 −
Ω(K))(K −Kl)φ(K)dK = [(1− q)/q]
R Kh
Kpool
(Kh −K)φ(K)dK = [(1− q)/q] (Kpool −
Kl)
R Kh
Kpool
(Kh −K) 1(K−Kl)2dK.
Integration by part yields
E
£
Πout|l¤ = 1− q
q
(Kpool −Kl)
"·
−Kh −K
K −Kl
¸Kh
Kpool
−
Z Kh
Kpool
1
K −Kl
dK
#
Using Kpool = qKl + (1− q)Kh, we obtain equation (3).
27
Proof of Proposition 3. We show that the mixed strategies in Proposition 3
constitute a Nash equilibrium. First, consider the insider’s strategy, taking the out-
sider’s and insurer’s strategies as given. Kin(h) = Kh is optimal since Kin(h) < Kh
results in an expected loss and Kin(h) > Kh yields the same expected payoﬀ as
Kin(h) = Kh. Kin(l) > KmaxART is never optimal since a low risk-type will then buy the
ART product; Kin(l) < Kpool is also never optimal since the rent can be increased
by increasing Kin(l). Hence, Kin(l) ∈ (Kpool, KmaxART ). Given the outsider’s strategy
Φ(K) = [K −Kpool] / [K −Kl] for K ∈ (Kpool,KmaxART ),the insider’s expected profit is
Πin(Kin(l)) = q[(1−Φ(Kin(l)))(Kin(l)−Kl)] = q (Kpool −Kl) and therefore indepen-
dent of the own oﬀer for any Kin(l) ∈ (Kpool, KmaxART ) . The insider’s mixed strategy
in the proposition is therefore a best response. We now consider the outsider’s strat-
egy. It is never optimal for the outsider to choose K 6= Kout ∈ {(Kpool,KmaxART ), Kh};
for K < Kpool both types accept the contract and their expected loss exceeds the
premium; for KmaxART < Kout < Kh only the high-risk type accepts the contract at a
premium below his expected loss. For Kout = Kh, Πout(Kout) = 0, and for Kout ∈
(Kpool, KmaxART ), Πout(Kout) = (1−Ω(Kout))(Kout−Kpool)+Ω(Kout)(1−q)(Kout−Kh) =
0 given the mixed strategy Ω(K) = [K −Kpool] / [q(K −Kl)] derived in Proposition
1. Therefore, the outsider’s mixed strategy is weakly optimal. ¤
Equation (7). ∆ = E [Πout|l]−E [Πout|l, ART ] where E [Πout|l] is given by equation
(3). E [Πout|l, ART ] is the expected cross subsidization when the ART product is
available. It is derived in the same way as equation (3), with the only diﬀerence that
Kh is replaced by KmaxART in the integral. We obtain
E
£
Πout|l, ART ¤ = (1− q)2
q
(Kh −Kl)
·
1
1− q −
Kh −Kl
Briskl
− ln B
risk
l
(1− q) (Kh −Kl)
¸
,
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using Kpool = qKh + (1− q)Kl and KmaxART = Kl +Briskl . Taking diﬀerences yields
∆ =
(1− q)2
q
(Kh −Kl)
·
Kh −Kl
Briskl
− ln
·
Kh −Kl
Briskl
¸
− 1
¸
,
which is positive since Bcrit2 < B < Bcrit1 implies (Kh −Kl) /Briskl > 1.
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Figures
Figure 1: Insider’s rent and cross subsidization
Notes: Since the basis risk of the ART product depends on B and plT and pl, the figure shows the
dependence of the insider’s rent and the cross subsidization on the basis risk of the ART product for
given pTl and pl.
Notes: Reinsurance Cat XL covers for 14 main markets (CAMARES study by Swiss Re) and
global volume of cat bonds in USD B. Cat bond volume has remained at approximately 1%
of the catastrophe reinsurance volume since introduction in 1995.
Source: Guy Carpenter (2004) and Swiss Re (2002)
Figure 2: Reinsurance Cat XL covers versus Cat bonds
Figure 3: Number of Cat bond issues since 1997
Notes: Number of Cat bond issues per year from 1997 to 2002.
Source: Guy Carpenter (2004)
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Figure 4: Ratio of catastrophe insurance premiums to expected losses
Notes: Ratio of catastrophe reinsurance premiums to expected losses for 1994 to 2002.
Source: Swiss Re (2002)
Figure 5: Geographical distribution of reinsurance Cat XL covers and cat bonds
Notes: Geographical distribution of reinsurance Cat XL covers and catastrophe bonds in
percentage of total for 1997 and 2001.
Source: Guy Carpenter (2004), Swiss Re (2002), and Swiss Re (1997)
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